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M.N. Clubwala v. Fida Hussain Saheb, 1964

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M.N. Clubwala v. Fida Hussain Saheb, (1964) 6 SCR 642, 651 This case interpretation/case summary is written by Ms. Swati Sharma a student at the Faculty of Law (Delhi University). If you also want to publish your articles or case interpretations/summaries, send your work to  niyamskanoon09@gmail.com . Case Details PETITIONER:  MRS. M. N. CLUBWALA AND ANR. Vs. RESPONDENT: FIDA HUSSAIN SAHEB AND ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/02/1964 BENCH: MUDHOLKAR, J.R. SUBBARAO, K. CITATION: 1965 AIR 610 1964 SCR (6) 642 Introduction   The case of M.N. Clubwala v. Fida Hussain Saheb (1964) under the Delhi Rent Control Act is a landmark judgment that clarifies the distinction between a lease and a license and the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. The primary issue in this case was whether the agreements between the landlord (M.N. Clubwala) and the shopkeepers (Fida Hussain Saheb) created a lease or a license.  Facts of the Case M.N. Clubwala (Landlord) used his building as market by
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Ajay Kumar Parmar v. State of Rajasthan, 2012

Ajay Kumar Parmar v. State of Rajasthan, 2012 Case Summary

Facts

  1. An FIR was registered on 23.03.1997 after a statement under S.161 of Crpc made before the Dy. SP by the victim Pushpa in which she stated that the appellants Ajay Kumar Parmar and his father had raped her on 10.03.1997. 
  2. On an application made by Pushpa, as she was unsatisfied with the investigation of the police, the CJM, Sirohi directed the Judicial Magistrate, Sheoganj to take her statement under S.164 of the CrPC.
  3. The plaintiff in her statement under S.164 before the Judicial Magistrate stated that the FIR and the statement recorded before the Dy. SP was false and no offence had been committed. Therefore the Magistrate acquitted the appellant.

Case History

  1. The Session Court while allowing the revision petition filed by the Public Prosecutor reversed the order of the Magistrate on two grounds:- 
    1. Section 342 and 376 of IPC are triable by the Session Court, therefore no Magistrate can acquit the appellant on any ground, he is bound to transfer the case to the Session Court.
    2. The statement of the plaintiff cannot be relied on as she had not been produced before the Magistrate by the Police.
  2. The appeal by the appellant was dismissed by the High Court.
  3. Therefore the appeal came here.

Issue 

  1. Whether the Magistrate had the jurisdiction to acquit the accused-appellant.

Ratio Decidendi

  1. The statement before the Magistrate under Section 164, CrPC by a person other than the accused can be recorded only when the person is produced by the police, as observed in "Jogendra Nahak and Ors. v. State of Orissa and Ors. (1999)".
  2. In the present case, no police had produced the prosecutrix before the Magistrate.
  3. The person making a statement before the Magistrate shall be personally known by the Magistrate or identified by any other person, as observed in "Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana, 2001".
  4. The committal court is not empowered to decide whether a prima facie case has been made or not. If it does so as was earlier provided in S.207A of the Old Code, it will go beyond the legislative intent, as observed in Sanjay Gandhi v. UoI (1978).
  5. A Magistrate can not proceed with trial of an offence exclusively triable by the Session Court and acquit the accused.
  6. The Magistrate cannot consider the evidence which has been produced in the defence by the appellant, he can only consider the documents which has been submitted by the investigating agency along with the chargesheet.
  7. The Magistrate can refuse under S.190, CrPC to take cognizance of the offence only if he is satisfied that the complaint, case diary and statements of witnesses do not make out any offence.
  8. It is necessary to give notice to the complainant before dropping the proceedings, which has not been given in the present case.

Decision

  1. Appeal dismissed
  2. The judgment of the revisional court and the High Court is upheld. 

Summary

An FIR was registered for an offence under S.376 which is exclusively triable by the Session Court. The Judicial Magistrate denied taking cognizance of the offence and also acquitted the accused-appellants after taking the statement of the prosecutrix without identifying her under S.164 in which the prosecutrix had resiled from her earlier statements. The Apex Court while referring to various decisions of earlier cases held that the Magistrate is not empowered to decide whether a prima facie case has been made or not. If he does so as was earlier provided in S.207A of the Old Code, it will go beyond the legislative intent. S.209 of the CrPC provides that the Magistrate shall commit the case which is exclusively triable by the Session Court to the Session Court.


 


 

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Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. Ltd. v. Riche (1875)

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