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M.N. Clubwala v. Fida Hussain Saheb, 1964

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M.N. Clubwala v. Fida Hussain Saheb, (1964) 6 SCR 642, 651 This case interpretation/case summary is written by Ms. Swati Sharma a student at the Faculty of Law (Delhi University). If you also want to publish your articles or case interpretations/summaries, send your work to  niyamskanoon09@gmail.com . Case Details PETITIONER:  MRS. M. N. CLUBWALA AND ANR. Vs. RESPONDENT: FIDA HUSSAIN SAHEB AND ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/02/1964 BENCH: MUDHOLKAR, J.R. SUBBARAO, K. CITATION: 1965 AIR 610 1964 SCR (6) 642 Introduction   The case of M.N. Clubwala v. Fida Hussain Saheb (1964) under the Delhi Rent Control Act is a landmark judgment that clarifies the distinction between a lease and a license and the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. The primary issue in this case was whether the agreements between the landlord (M.N. Clubwala) and the shopkeepers (Fida Hussain Saheb) created a lease or a license.  Facts of the Case M.N. Clubwala (Landlord) used his building as market by
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Moro Vishwanath v. Ganesh Vithal, 1873

 Moro Vishwanath v. Ganesh Vithal, 1873

This is an appeal from the decision of first Subordinate Judge of Ratnagiri.

Fact

The respondent is the 5th lineal descendant and the appellant is the 4th lineal descendant of Udhav (the original owner of the property).

Issue

  1. Whether the respondent (plaintiff) is entitled to ask for partition of ancestral property or not?

  • Ans- No, because plaintiff is the 5th lineal descendant of the original owner.

Ratio and Observation

  1. JUSTICE WEST
    • No partition may take place after fourth descendants from common ancestor. 
    • The special Sapinda relationship ends with the fourth descendant.
  2. JUSTICE NANABHAI HARIDAS
    • No partition suit can at all lie between the appellant and the respondent.

  • The lower court was erred in holding that the property in dispute was joint ancestral property. In the present case, the respondent was not a co-parcener being the 5th descendant and therefore he had no right to ask for partition in the coparcenary property.
  • The doctrine of ancestral property vested by birth in one’s son, grandson, and great- grandson. This capacity does not extend beyond the fourth descent.

Judgment

The appeal allowed and the court held that the respondent had no right to ask partition being the 5th descendant or coparcener of an ancestral property.

Summary

A partition cannot be demanded by one more than four degrees removed from the last owner of the property not acquirer of original owner of the property.


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Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. Ltd. v. Riche (1875)

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Ashbury railway carriage v riche|| Case Summary  Introduction   This case is related to the " Doctrine of Ultra Vires". In this case, the directors of the appellant company made an agreement with the plaintiff which was beyond the objectives, as mentioned in its MoA, of the appellant Company. Since the agreement was beyond its objectives, the appellant company repudiated the agreement later. Therefore the suit was brought by the plaintiff to recover the damages. Facts   The directors of the appellant company (Ashbury Railway Carriage) had contracted to obtain a concession from Gillon and Poeters Baerston, who obtained this right from the Belgian Government, to make a railway.  For this purpose, the directors of the appellant company again entered into a contract with Riche, a contractor, the purpose of which was to establish a société anonyme,  and as the plaintiff went on with the work, the appellant company had to pay into the hands of société anonyme,  Earlier the sharehol
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Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate, AIR 1958 SC 353

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Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate, AIR 1958 SC 353 Case Summary Introduction The case of Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate involved a dispute between the management of the Dimakuchi Tea Estate and its workers. This case has discussed and cleared the meaning of the expression "any person" used in S.2(K) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. The Supreme Court ruled in favour of a limited interpretation of the term "any person" thereby excluding the present appellant from the ambit of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947. This decision denied the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate the dispute and extended the benefits and protections of the Act to the employers. Facts of the Case The dispute was raised over the termination of the service of Dr K.P. Banerjee, who was appointed as an Assistant Medical Officer in the Respondent's estate (Dimakuchi Tea Estate), on the grounds of being incompetent. Although th
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