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M.N. Clubwala v. Fida Hussain Saheb, 1964

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M.N. Clubwala v. Fida Hussain Saheb, (1964) 6 SCR 642, 651 This case interpretation/case summary is written by Ms. Swati Sharma a student at the Faculty of Law (Delhi University). If you also want to publish your articles or case interpretations/summaries, send your work to  niyamskanoon09@gmail.com . Case Details PETITIONER:  MRS. M. N. CLUBWALA AND ANR. Vs. RESPONDENT: FIDA HUSSAIN SAHEB AND ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/02/1964 BENCH: MUDHOLKAR, J.R. SUBBARAO, K. CITATION: 1965 AIR 610 1964 SCR (6) 642 Introduction   The case of M.N. Clubwala v. Fida Hussain Saheb (1964) under the Delhi Rent Control Act is a landmark judgment that clarifies the distinction between a lease and a license and the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. The primary issue in this case was whether the agreements between the landlord (M.N. Clubwala) and the shopkeepers (Fida Hussain Saheb) created a lease or a license.  Facts of the Case M.N. Clubwala (Landlord) used his building as market by

Abhay Singh Chautala v. C.B.I (2011) 7 SCC 141

 Abhay Singh Chautala vs. C.B.I

Hon'ble Judges/Coram: V.S. Sirpurkar and T.S. Thakur, JJ.

Introduction 

A very interesting and famous case under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, where several charges under the Act were made on a political person who had represented various constituencies in the Lok Sabha and Legislative Assembly of States. The objection raised here by the appellants were over the previous sanction required by the Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 before taking cognizance of offence by the court.

Facts

On the order of a Writ Petition No. 93 of 2003, while investigating the JBT Teachers recruitment scam the CBI conducted searches and seized incriminating documents which revealed that Shri Om Prakash Chautala and his family had amassed wealth more than from his known sources of income. A regular FIR had been filed against Om Prakash Chautala and his family. It is found in the investigation that Abhay Singh Chautala and Ajay Singh Chautala had amassed wealth much more than from his known sources of income while being in office as MP and MLA of different constituencies. Therefore the CBI had filed a charge sheet against the appellants under Prevention of Corruption Act 1988. An objection regarding the absence of sanction under section 19 of the Act was raised before the Special Judge CBI, who held that since the allegations were not made for his current office, there is no need to take a previous sanction under S.19. The High court also dismissed the challenge petition made under section 482 CrPC. Therefore these two Special Leave Petitions came before this court (Supreme Court). 

Contentions of the Appellant

  1. The appellants were a public servant on the day when charges were framed. Thus, the cognizance of the offences under PCA, could not be taken by a Court in the absence of a sanction.
  2. Judgement of this Court in Prakash Singh Badal case (2007) and RS Nayak v. A.R. Antulay (1984) were incorrect and required reconsideration.
  3. Decisions in RS Nayak v. A.R. Antulay (1984) were not right as-
    1. It didn't consider the plain language of Section 19.
    2. It concluded that the MLA is not a public servant.
    3. The proviso added to the section 19 as an effect of this case, would be impermissible as it would negate the foundation of criminal law.
  4. Section 19(1) mentions two terms i.e. "public servant" and  "person". "Public office" should mean the past office and "person" should mean the present office.
  5. S.2(vi),(vii),(vii),(ix),(x) talks about such public servant who hold their office for a limited time. 

Ratio Decidendi

  1. The decision of RS Nayak v. A.R. Antulay (1984) has stood the test of time for over 25 years. So there is no need to reconsider.
  2. The Act do not contemplates of such public servant who holds an office different from the office during which the offence has been committed.
  3. This Court in Antulay's case held that there is no need to have a sanction for prosecuting such public servant who is holding an office different from the office that had been abused by him previously.
  4. The suggested proviso contemplates a different"post" and not the "office".
  5. Section 19 contemplates, in its literal meaning, a person who continues to be a public servant on the date of taking cognizance. However, the court interprets by necessary implication as it excludes such public servant who had abused previous office other than present office on the date of taking cognizance. Therefore literally interpretation of the section would lead to absurdity.
  6. S.19(1)(a),(b),(c) mention "person" which means the accused who is employed as an public servant. Whereas the main body of S.19(1) mentions "public servant" because the offence had been committed by him means while being in that office as a public servant.
  7. S.19 is very clear that no requirement of such sanction is necessary if the accused is not a public servant at the time of trial.
  8. Also, S.19(2) is also very clear on non requirement of sanction for those accused public servant who held various offices.

Decisions

  1. Dismissed appeal
  2. No sanction is required where the accused had held plurality of offices as a public servant.

Conclusion

Although S.19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 provides for a previous sanction necessary from the appointing authority of the public servant, it doesn't include such public servant who holds plurality of offices as a public servant. S.19(2) also provides for such sanction not be required where a doubt arises regarding the appointing authority. 

Summary

The apex court in a SLP dismissed the contentions made by the appellant regarding the requirement of sanction under S.19(1) of PCA before taking cognizance of the offences. The Court held that such sanction under S.19(1) is not required to prosecute a public servant who holds various offices.

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